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The Pelham Decision, Attorney
Malpractice and Third-Party Nonclient
Recovery: The Rise and Fall of Privity
I.

INTRODUCTION

Traditionally, a privity of contract requirement1 has protected
attorneys from malpractice claims2 asserted by individuals who are

not their clients.' Generally, the primary reason for the use of this
rather artificial rule4 in the area of tort law is to limit liability for
fear of unlimited "absurd and outrageous consequences."3 How-

l.Privity of contract is defined as "[tihat connection or relationship which
exists between two or more contracting parties." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1079

(rev. 5th ed. 1979). For a general discussion of privity and liability to third parties, see W. PROSSER, THE HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 93 (4th ed. 1971).
See also 72 C.J.S. Privity (1951).
2. Civil liability of an attorney may be predicated upon one of several legal
theories: breach of either express or implied contract, breach of fiduciary duty,
breach of implied warranty and negligence. Note, The Illinois Legal Malpractice
Tort: Basic Tenets and Recent Trends, 1980 U. ILL. L.F. 427, 428 nn.6-13, 429 nn.
12-13. For a comprehensive discussion of the various legal theories asserted in
attorney malpractice claims, see R. MALLEN & V. LEvrr, LEGAL MALPRACTICE §§

71-72 (2d ed. 1981). See also C.

KINREGAN, MALPRACTICE AND THE LAWYER

(1978);

Wade, The Attorney's Liability for Negligence, 12 VAND. L. REV. 755 (1959);
Symposium: Legal Malpractice, 30 S.C.L. REv. 201 (1979).
Malpractice claims based on fraud, collusion or other intentional acts can be
brought by persons damaged by such acts irrespective of privity. Note, Attorney's
Liability to Third Parties for Malpractice:The Growing Acceptance of Liability
in the Absence of Privity, 21 WASHBURN L.J. 48 n.4 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
Note, Liability in the Absence of Privity].
3. The leading case is Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1879). See infra
notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
4. Negligence theory is based upon social responsibility irrespective of contractual privity. The absence of a contract should not permit a defendant to act in
a socially irresponsible manner. As explained by Dean Prosser:
[B]y entering into a contract with A, the defendant may place himself in
such a relation toward B that the law will impose upon him an obligation, sounding in tort and not contract, to act in such a way that B will
not be injured. The incidental fact of the existence of the contract with A
does not negative the responsibility of the actor when he enters upon a
course of affirmative conduct which may be expected to affect the interests of another person.
W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 93.
5. Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 405 (Ex. 1842); see infra note
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ever, courts' and commentators 7 have realized that this fear of unrestrained liability is counterbalanced, if not outweighed, by the
resulting denial of compensation to injured third-party plaintiffs
and the societal detriment of undeterred attorney misconduct.9
This realization has evolved into a present trend away from the
strict requirement of privity"0 in the area of attorney malpractice
6. See, e.g., Fickett v. Superior Court, 27 Ariz. App. 793, 558 P.2d 988 (1976)
(attorney liable to ward for guardian's misappropriation of ward's estate); Licata
v. Spector, 26 Conn. Supp. 378, 225 A.2d 28 (1966) (attorney liable to beneficiary
of negligently drafted will); McAbee v. Edwards, 340 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1976) (attorney liable to intended beneficiaries of negligently drawn will);
Mountain States Implement Co. v. Sharp, 94 Idaho 225, 486 P.2d 80 (1971) (attorney liable for costs incurred by third party); Pelham v. Griesheimer, 92 Ill. 2d
13, 440 N.E.2d 96 (1982) (recognizing duty to intended third-party beneficiary of
the attorney-client relationship); Brody v. Ruby, 267 N.W.2d 902 (Iowa 1978)
(recognizing third-party beneficiary theory of recovery for alleged attorney negligence); Clagett v. Dacy, 47 Md. App. 23, 420 A.2d 1285 (1980) (recognizing thirdparty beneficiary theory of recovery for alleged attorney negligence); Presscott v.
Coppage, 266 Md. 562, 296 A.2d 150 (1972) (attorney liable to primary creditor
for allowing assets to be paid to lower priority creditors); Marker v. Greenberg,
313 N.W.2d 4 (Minn. 1981); Stewart v. Sbarro, 142 N.J. Super. 581, 362 A.2d 581
(Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976) (attorney liable to adverse party in sale of property
where he undertook duty to complete transaction for adverse party); McEvoy v.
Helikson, 277 Or. 781, 562 P.2d 540 (1977) (wife's attorney liable to husband
where he acted as an escrow agent and breached duty under divorce settlement).
7. See, e.g., R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 2, §§ 71-81; Greenwald, The
Law of the Lawyer, Malpractice Action by Nonclient, 27 PRAC. LAW. 86 (No. 2
1981); Issaacs, Liability of the Lawyer for Bad Advice, 24 CALIF. L. REv. 39
(1935); Meiselman, Attorney Liability to Third Parties,53 N.Y. ST. B.J. 108, 142
(1981) ("[Tlhe clear and distinct movement is away from privity and toward expansion of liability exposure."); Probert & Hendricks, Lawyer Malpractice:Duty
Relationships Beyond Contract, 55 NOTRE DAME LAW. 708, 728 (1980) ("No enterprise should be a legal island."); Note, Attorneys' Negligence and Third Parties, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 126, 126 (1982) ("[Tjhird party plaintiffs have been denied
compensation and attorney misconduct has not been deterred."); Note, Liability
of Lawyers to Third Partiesfor Professional Negligence, 60 OR. L. REV. 375, 389
(1981) ("The prophylactic factor, concerned with preventing future harm, is frustrated by the rule."); Note, Liability in the Absence of Privity, supra note 2, at 71

("There will always be lawyers who negligently perform their services, and it is
those persons, rather than innocent third parties, upon whom courts are beginning to place the loss for the lawyer's negligence.").
8. Note, Attorneys' Negligence and Third Parties, supra note 7, at 126-27
(third parties are generally less blameworthy and less capable of absorbing costs
of attorney negligence).
9. Id. at 127 (third-party recovery is effective tool for policing attorney
misconduct).
10. The majority of jurisdictions have supported the strict privity rule. See,
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which coincides with the trend in tort law generally."

This note will first briefly discuss the concept of privity of
contract in its historical perspective, analyzing the genesis 2 and
subsequent exodus 8 away from the requirement. Next, the various
tests utilized by courts in extending recovery to third-party nonclients for attorney negligence will be analyzed to illuminate their

respective strengths and weaknesses. Three theories that have
been applied by courts include an assumption of duty theory,' 4 a

factor-balancing theory,' 5 and a third-party beneficiary theory.' s
Finally, the recent Illinois Supreme Court case of Pelham v.

7
will be analyzed and its ramifications on Illinois lawGriesheimer1
yers will be examined.' 8

II.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE CONCEPT OF PRIVITY OF
CONTRACT

The privity of contract requirement had its genesis"' in the
e.g., McGlone v. Lacey, 288 F. Supp. 662 (D.S.D. 1968) (applying South Dakota
law); Sachs v. Levy, 216 F. Supp. 44 (E.D. Pa. 1963) (applying Pennsylvania law);
Jacobsen v. Overseas Tankship Corp., 11 F.R.D. 97 (E.D.N.Y. 1950); Lackey v.
Vickery, 57 F. Supp. 791 (W.D. Mo. 1944) (applying Missouri law); Weigle v. Hardesty, 37 Colo. App. 541, 549 P.2d 1335 (1973); Young v. Hecht, 3 Kan. App. 2d
510, 597 P.2d 682 (1979); Rose v. Davis, 388 Ky. 674, 157 S.W.2d 284 (1941),
overruled on other grounds, Penrod v. Penrod, 489 S.W.2d 524 (Ky. 1972); Friedman v. Dorzorc, 83 Mich. App. 429, 268 N.W.2d 673 (1978); Victor v. Goldman, 74
Misc. 2d 685, 344 N.Y.S.2d 672 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 43 A.D.2d 1021, 351 N.Y.S.2d
956, (1973); Thomas Fruit Co. v. Levergood, 135 Okla. 105, 274 P. 471 (1929);
Metzer v. Slocum, 272 Or. 313, 537 P.2d 74 (1975); Hughes v. Housley, 599 P.2d
1250 (Utah 1979); Abdella v. Catlin, 79 Wis. 2d 270, 255 N.W.2d 516 (1977);
Goerke v. Vojvodich, 67 Wis. 2d 102, 26 N.W.2d 211 (1975).
11. See W. PROSSER, supra note 1, §§ 96, 107; Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REv. 791 (1966); Prosser, The
Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099
(1960). See also MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.J. 382, 111 N.E. 1050
(1916) (discussed infra notes 37-40 and accompanying text); Glanzer v. Shepard,
233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922) (discussed infra notes 41-44 and accompanying
text).
12. See infra notes 19-30 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 31-48, 57-102 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 57-76 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 77-87 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 88-95 and accompanying text.
17. 92 Ill. 2d 13, 440 N.E.2d 96 (1982). See infra notes 96-122 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 123-46 and accompanying text.
19. For other discussions on the historical perspective of privity, see Note,
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English case of Winterbottom v. Wright.2 0 Holding that one cannot
maintain an action for negligence" in the absence of contractual
privity," the court reasoned that to hold otherwise would allow
"absurd and outrageous consequences

23

to follow and there would

be "no point at which such action will stop."'" The court also reasoned that it would be unjust to grant a right to a party outside of
25
the contract.
In 1879, the United States Supreme Court followed the English rule in deciding the case of Savings Bank v. Ward.26 In Savings Bank, an attorney who was retained to investigate title to a
parcel of real estate, overlooked a previously recorded deed. After
Attorneys' Negligence and Third Parties,supra note 7, at 132; Note, Liability in
the Absence of Privity, supra note 2, at 49.
20. 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842). In this case, an injured coach driver
brought suit against the coach manufacturer for injuries caused by defendant's
alleged negligence. The plaintiff alleged that the manufacturer's contract with the
owner-employer entitled the driver, an employee of the owner, to a cause of
action.
21. The traditional formula for the elements necessary to such a cause of
action may be stated briefly as follows:
1. A duty, or obligation, recognized by the law, requiring the actor to
conform to a certain standard of conduct, for the protection of others
against unreasonable risks.
2. A failure on his part to conform to the standard required. These [first]
two elements go to make up what the courts usually have called negligence; but the term quite frequently is applied to the second alone. Thus
it may be said that the defendant was negligent, but is not liable because
he was under no duty to the plaintiff not to be.
3. A reasonable close causal connection between the conduct and the resulting injury. This is what is commonly known as "legal cause" or
"proximate cause."
4. Actual loss or damage resulting to the interests of another ....
W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 30.
22. 152 Eng. Rep. at 405 (Ex. 1842).
23. Id. (Abinger, L.J.).
24. Id. (Alderson, B.).
25. By permitting this action, we should be working this injustice, that
after the defendant had done everything to the satisfaction of his employer, and after all matters between them had been adjusted, and all
accounts settled on the footing of their contract, we should subject them
to be ripped open by this action of tort being brought against him.
Id. (Abinger, L.J.).
26. 100 U.S. 195 (1879). Other American courts had already adopted the English rule, but Savings Bank was the first U.S. Supreme Court ruling concerning
the scope of an attorney's duty beyond that owed to his client. See, e.g., Mardis'
Adm'Rs v. Shackleford, 6 Ala. 433 (1844); Sevier v. Holliday, 2 Ark. 512 (1840).
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the attorney's client had defaulted on a loan, secured by the real
estate,27 the plaintiff bank sought recovery against the attorney. It
was held that absent fraud, collusion or knowledge of the attorney
as to the use to be made of his work,28 the attorney was liable only
to his client. The Supreme Court reasoned that without privity of
contract, the attorney could owe no duty 9 to Savings Bank. Absent a duty to the bank, there could be no breach and hence no
cause of action for negligence.8"
In 1895, the Supreme Court of California in the case of Buckley v. Gray"' adopted the privity of contract requirement set out in
Savings Bank."' A claim of negligence was asserted by a residuary
legatee against an attorney for allegedly drafting and executing a
will improperly. 8 The plaintiff claimed to be a third-party beneficiary,84 arguing that the will had been drawn for his benefit. The
court reasoned that in the absence of fraud or collusion, the individual seeking recovery must specifically be owed a duty by the
person who allegedly caused the injury. While recognizing the
plaintiff's theory of recovery, the court held that there was no duty
owed by the attorney to the plaintiff because no evidence had been
27. When the attorney's client had defaulted on the loan payments, the bank
attempted to obtain the property; however, it was unsuccessful. 100 U.S. at 198.
28. Id. at 199. The Court specifically stated:
Neither fraud nor collusion is alleged or proved; and it is conceded that
the certificates were made by the defendant at the request of the applicant for the loan, without any knowledge on the part of the defendant
what use was to be made of the same or to whom they were to be
presented ....
Further, the Court stated:
Beyond all doubt, the general rule is that the obligation of the attorney is
to his client and not to a third party, and unless there is something in
the circumstances of this case to take it out of the general rule, it seems
clear that the proposition of the defendant must be sustained.
Id. at 200.
29. See supra note 21 for elements of a cause of action for negligence.
30. Id.
31. 110 Cal. 339, 42 P. 900 (1895). This case was subsequently specifically
overruled in Biankanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958). See infra
note 77 and accompanying text.
32. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
33. The plaintiff/legatee would have inherited a substantial amount under
his mother's will. However, the attorney allowed one of the four residuary legatees
to attest to the will, thus rendering the entire bequest void.
34. For a general discussion on third-party beneficiary theory, see 4 A.
CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 772-781 (1951 & Supp. 1982); 7 Am. JUR. 2D Contracts, §§
302-319 (1964). See infra note 88 and accompanying text.
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introduced that the will had been made expressly for his benefit."
Thus, prior to the turn of the century, exceptions to the privity of contract requirement in cases specifically dealing with attorneys' liability to third-party nonclients had been recognized."'
These privity exceptions included the general exception for fraud
or collusion and the exception where the attorney-client relationship is entered into with the intent to expressly benefit a third
party.
A substantial weakening of the privity of contract requirement
occurred in 1916 with the celebrated products liability case of
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.8 7 The New York Court of Ap-

peals, in an opinion written by Judge Benjamin Cardozo, recognized a duty owed to individuals outside of the sales contract for
negligent activity by the seller-manufacturer.38 Here the nature of
the defendant's activities, automobile manufacturing, gave rise to
the foreseeability of probable physical injury" in the absence of
due care. The defendants had knowledge that the product would
be used by persons other than the purchasers."'
Six years later in the case of Glanzer v. Shepard,1 the New
35. 110 Cal. at 347, 42 P. at 902. The court stated:
The contract between the plaintiff's mother and the defendant, which
was the subject of the breach, cannot be said in any legal sense to have
been expressly made for the plaintiff's benefit. It was a contract for employment of defendant's services as an attorney, to draft the will of Mrs.
Buckley, the immediate purpose of which was for the benefit of the latter
....
Remotely, it is true, she intended plaintiff to be benefited as a
result of such contract ....
[The will] created a mere possibility in

Id.

plaintiff; not a right which made him in law a privy to the contract.

36. See supra notes 26-35 and accompanying text.
37. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
38. In MacPherson, the purchaser of a car from a retail dealer asserted a
claim of negligence against the defendant car manufacturer for injuries sustained
when one of the wooden wheels fell apart. The defendant did not manufacture the
wheel but in turn bought it from another manufacturer. The plaintiff argued that
a reasonable inspection by the defendant would have led to the discovery of the
defect and thus would have prevented the injury. Id. at 384, 111 N.E. at 1051.
39. Id. at 386, 111 N.E. at 1052. Specifically, the court stated:
We have put aside the notion that the duty to safeguard life and limb,
when the consequences of negligence may be foreseen, grows out of contract and nothing else. We have put the source where it ought to be. We
have put its source in the law.
Id.
40. Id.
41. 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
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York Court of Appeals, in another opinion written by Judge Cardozo, recognized a duty owed by a public weigher of beans to the
ultimate buyer for a negligent misstatement of weight to the
seller.4 2 The existence of the duty was based upon the foreseeability of the buyer's reliance."' Here the facts showed that the plaintiff's reliance on the certificate of weight issued by the defendant
was "a consequence which, to the weigher's knowledge, was the
4
end and aim of the transaction." 4
The parameters of the Glanzer holding were more clearly delineated nine years later by the New York Court of Appeals in the
case of Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co." This case involved an accounting firm's negligent certification of the financial
condition of a corporation to which the third-party creditor had
loaned money in reliance on the firm's representations. In holding

that no duty existed between the accounting firm and the third-

party creditor, the court distinguished this case from Glanzer by
finding that no foreseeability of reliance existed." The court, fearing "liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate
time to an indeterminate class, ' 7 reasoned that in the absence of
the defendant's knowledge of a specific indentifiable third party
42. The court stated that duty need not be "in terms of contract of privity."
Id. at 237, 135 N.E. at 276.
43. Judge Cardozo stated that "the bounds of duty are enlarged by knowledge of a prospective use." Id. Cf. Jaillet v. Cashman, 235 N.Y. 511, 139 N.E. 714
(per curiam) (1923). In Jaillet, the New York Court of Appeals in a unanimous
judgment did not recognize a duty owed by the defendant who negligently published on its tickers an erroneous report that the United States Supreme Court
had held that stock dividends constituted taxable income. The plaintiff, relying
on the tickers, disposed of his stock before the tickers were corrected. The court
held that no duty could exist in the absence of a contract or fiduciary
relationship.
44. 233 N.Y. at 236, 135 N.E. at 275.
45. 255 N.Y. 170,. 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
46. Referring to Glanzer, the Ultramares court stated:
Here was something more than the rendition of a service in the expectation that the one who ordered the certificate would use it thereafter in
the operations of his business as occasion might require. Here was a case
where the transmission of the certificate to another was not merely one
possibility among many, but the end and aim of the transaction, as certain and immediate and deliberately willed as if a husband were to order
a gown to be delivered to his wife, or a telegraph company, contracting
with the sender of a message, were to telegraph it wrongly to the damage
of the person expected to receive it.
Id. at 182, 174 N.E. at 445.
47. Id. at 181, 174 N.E. at 444.
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who may be economically injured, the privity of contract require-

ment must still be satisfied. 8
While courts no longer fear the absurd and outrageous consequences that might result in granting exceptions to the privity of
contract requirement, the hesitancy still lingers. Despite this fear,
the aforementioned cases support the argument that the privity of

contract requirement will be relaxed when the contractual relation-

ship is such that parties outside of the contract are subject to foreseeable physical injury in the absence of due care.' 9 However,
where the nature of the contractual relationship is such that parties outside of the contract are subject only to foreseeable economic loss, it must be shown that the intent to benefit the third
party was the "end and aim" of the contract. 50
III.

PRESERVATION OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP

Additionally, it must be considered that the extension of re-

covery to parties outside of the contract has the possibility of af48. In a word, the service rendered by the defendant in Glanzer v. Shepard was primarily for the information of a third person, in effect, if not in
name, a party to the contract, and only incidentally for that of the formal promisee. In the case at hand, the service was primarily for the benefit of the Stern Company, a convenient instrumentality for use in the
development of the business, and only incidentally or collaterally for the
use of those to whom Stern and his associates might exhibit it thereafter.
Foresight of these possibilities may charge with liability for fraud. The
conclusion does not follow that it will charge with liability for negligence.
Id. at 183, 174 N.E. at 446.
In White v. Guarente, 43 N.Y.2d 356, 372 N.E.2d 315 (1977), the.New York
Court of Appeals held that an accountant retained to perform an audit and prepare tax returns for an identifiable group of limited partners should foresee that
one or more of those partners, or at least constituents of them, might rely on or
make use of audit and tax returns in order to properly prepare his or her own tax
returns.
For a general discussion of an accountant's liability to third parties, see Mess,
Accountants' Liability to Third Parties, 52 NOTRE DAME LAW. 838 (1977). According to Mess, the Ultramares decision is no longer valid because the use of
financial reports by third parties who are expected to rely on them is no longer a
collateral matter to the preparation of the report for the client. The accountant
today has a role of central responsibility in the business community. See also
Haddon View Inv. Co. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 70 Ohio St. 2d 154, 436 N.E.2d 212
(1982); Note, Public Accountants and Attorneys: Negligence and the Third Par-

ties, 47

NOTRE DAME LAW.

588 (1972).

49. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
50. See supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text.
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fecting the contractual relationship itself.8 1 Preservation of the underlying attorney-client relationship should be a paramount goal of
the court. Since extension of recovery to all those foreseeably affected by the contractual relationship seriously endangers the preservation of that relationship, alternative and more restrictive theories must be recognized.
The attorney-client relationship is unquestionably a relationship that deserves such protection by the courts. The Code of Professional Responsibility requires that "[t]he professional judgment
of a lawyer should be exercised within the bounds of the law, solely
for the benefit of his client and free from compromising influences
. . . . [T]he desires of third persons should not be permitted to
dilute his loyalty to his clients."'" The final draft of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct5 3 provides that loyalty is an essential element in the lawyer's relationship to a client. The final draft
recognizes that an attorney's duty of loyalty to his client is likely
to be impaired when an attorney's responsibilities or interests foreclose alternatives that would otherwise be available to the client."
The attorney cannot be burdened with the conflicting responsibility of always having to look over his shoulder for third parties.
This possibility of the weakening of the attorney-client relationship by granting recovery to third-party nonclients not only has
been noted by several courts but has prevented the extension of
liability to third-party nonclients. 55

IV.

ATTORNEY NEGLIGENCE AND THEORIES OF THIRD-PARTY
RECOVERY

There are presently three theories of recovery used by courts
when considering claims by third-party nonclients for alleged attorney negligence. These include an assumption of duty theory, a
factor-balancing theory and a third-party beneficiary theory of re51. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
52. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSMBILITY EC 5-1 (1980).
53. 68 A.B.A. J. (Supplement to Nov. 1982 issue).
54. "Loyalty to a client is impaired when a lawyer cannot consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate course of action for the client because of the
lawyer's other responsibilities or interests. The conflict in effect forecloses alternatives that would otherwise be available to the client." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Comment to Rule 1.7 (Final Draft 1982).

55. See infra note 96 and accompanying text. See also Claggett v. Dacy, 47
Md. 23, 420 A.2d 1285 (1980) (limitations on representation by attorney of conflicting interests must be taken into account in dealing with third-party actions).
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covery. It is the contention of the author that the third-party beneficiary theory test used by the Illinois Supreme Court 56 is the most
viable solution to the problem, although it does not cover all fact
patterns where recovery is appropriate.
A.

Assumption of Duty Theory

The assumption of duty theory is well known in tort law. 7
Once an individual gratuitously promises to act for the benefit of
another and he actually undertakes to fulfill that promise, he is
held to a duty of due care in fulfilling that promise.58 An old New
York decision,5 9 never overruled, holds that a mere gratuitous
promise to render services or assistance, with nothing more, imposes no tort obligation on the promisor. This case serves as a
point of reference with little extra required for the assumption of
duty to arise.60 The duty arises when the promisor actually initiates an undertaking to fulfill the promise. 1 This initiation or undertaking may be comprised of minor acts, "of no significance in
themselves and without any effect of their own upon the plaintiff's
interests." 2 Thus, once an attorney gratuitously promises to act
56. See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
57. W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 56. ("The idea of voluntary assumption of
duty runs through a variety of cases."). See, e.g., Thelan v. Spilman, 251 Minn.
89, 86 N.W.2d 700 (1957) (A driver who, though under no legal duty to do so,
voluntarily undertakes to signal a following driver that it is safe to pass, is liable
for reasonably foreseeable damages if signal negligently given); Foley v. Ulrich, 94
N.J. Super. 410, 228 A.2d 702 (1967), rev'd on other grounds, 50 N.J. 426, 236
A.2d 137 (1967) (One who, without any legal obligation to do so, attempts to remove ice from sidewalk may be liable if he increases the risk of injury); Le Juene
Road Hosp., Inc. v. Watson, 171 So. 2d 202 (Fla. App. 1965) (Private hospital,
while under no obligation to admit any patient that it does not desire, liable for
wrongfully discharging admitted patient).
58. Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 239-40, 135 N.E. 275, 276 (1922). The
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 provides:
[O]ne who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other's person or thing, is subject to liability to the other for
physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to
perform the undertaking if: (a) his failure to exercise such care increases
the risk of such harm, or (b) the harm is suffered because of the other's
reliance upon the undertaking.
59. Thornes v. Deas, 4 Johns. 84 (N.Y. 1809).
60. W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 56.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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for the benefit of a third-party nonclient, making a mere phone
call or taking possession of related papers or legal documents can
constitute an undertaking giving rise to a duty that the attorney
proceed with due care with respect to the third party.
However, in reference to attempted recovery by third-party
nonclients for alleged attorney negligence, the underlying attorneyclient relationship itself should not be confused, substituted or labeled as such an undertaking giving rise to a duty to third parties." The mere fact that an attorney performs tasks for the client
does not satisfy the undertaking requirement. 4 When an attorney
performs a task for a client, he does not necessarily assume a duty
of reasonable care to third parties. A duty of reasonable care to
third parties arises only when the attorney undertakes to perform
a task for a third party as he has promised. To hold otherwise
would be to transform the assumption of duty theory into one of
simple foreseeability with no regard for preservation or protection
of the attorney-client relationship." When an attorney gratuitously
assumes a duty to a third-party nonclient, he should be estopped
from arguing that a conflict of interest exists.
When the attorney-client relationship is created with the intent to benefit directly a third party, it can then be argued that the
attorney's undertaking gives rise to a duty to that third party.
However, then it is not an assumption of duty theory, but is more
appropriately classified as a third-party beneficiary theory" for
which no undertaking at all is required.
When an attorney assumes a duty to a third-party nonclient
through a gratuitous undertaking,6 7 several courts have unnecessarily complicated the situation by extending liability through use of
63. Note, Attorneys' Negligence and Third Parties,supra note 7. Referring
to the assumption of duty theory, the author states:
The theory can therefore stand as the foundation for a proper duty analysis. It recognizes that because of the nature of the services provided by
the attorneys, their actions foreseeably affect parties not in privity.
When attorneys undertake an action that foreseeably affects a third
party, they owe a duty of care to that individual.
Id. at 145.
64. There must be a gratuitous undertaking designed to confer a benefit on
the third party. See supra note 58.
65. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text for an explanation of why
the attorney-client relationship deserves protection by the courts.
66. See infra notes 88-95 and accompanying text.
67. If the undertaking was not gratuitous, but in fact was for consideration,
an attorney-client relationship would be formed.
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a fiduciary" or agency6 9 relationship theory. The recognition of
these relationships by the courts is not necessary or desired in the

assumption of duty theory, and reference to them should be discouraged. A duty of due care is sufficient to regulate the attorney's

conduct with clients and therefore should also be applied to those

to whom the attorney assumes a duty.
Several cases have utilized the assumption of duty theory. A
New Jersey case, Stewart v. Sbarro,7 involved a transaction for
the purchase and sale of stock. A key element of the consideration

for the sale was the assumption by the buyers of a note which was

the only corporate debt on which the sellers were exposed to per-

sonal liability. An addendum to the agreement provided that the
purchasers would execute a signed second mortgage to secure pay-

ment on the note. At the closing, the mortgage was not signed, and

the buyers' lawyer agreed to secure full execution of the docu-

ments. He failed to do so and when the defendant, Sbarro, went

bankrupt, the plaintiffs were relegated to the position of unsecured
creditors in the bankruptcy proceedings. The court held that when
an attorney undertakes a duty to one other than his client, he may

be liable for damages caused by a breach of that duty to a person

intended to be benefited by his performance.7 1 Evidently, the pos-

session of the documents constituted the undertaking which gave
rise to the duty once the attorney had gratuitously promised to
secure full execution of the documents.
In Schwartz v. Greenfield, Stein and Weisinger 7 2 the defen-

68. See Stewart v. Sbarro, 142 N.J. Super. 581, 362 A.2d 581, 588 (1976) (fiduciary theory offered as alternative theory). See also Note, Attorneys' Negligence and Third Parties, supra note 7, at 141.
69. See, e.g., McEvoy v. Hilikson, 277 Or. 781, 785-86, 562 P.2d 540, 542-43
(1973) (escrow agency theory offered as alternative theory); Simmerson v. Blanks,
149 Ga. App. 478, 254 S.E.2d 716 (1979) (gratuitous promise of attorney for the
purchaser of real estate to vendor that he would file financing statement on behalf
of vendor made attorney gratuitous agent of vendor).
70. 142 N.J. Super. 581, 362 A.2d 581 (1976).
71. The court did not hold that the attorney was at fault in failing to obtain
the needed signatures.
His deriliction was in not advising plaintiffs' attorney within a reasonable
time that all efforts have been unproductive and offering to return the
documents, and, more importantly, in participating in the preparation
and execution of the corporate second mortgage to Canio Sbarro and
wife, despite the fact that he was still in possession of the documents to
which plaintiffs were entitled.
Stewart, 362 A.2d at 588-89.
72. 90 Misc. 2d 882, 396 N.Y.S.2d 582 (1977).
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dant, a borrower's attorney, voluntarily agreed to file and perfect a
security agreement on behalf of the plaintiff-lender. The plaintiff
sued the attorney when he lost a security interest because the defendant had failed to file the agreement. The court held that once
74
the defendant voluntarily assumed the duty7 to file the papers
he was under a duty to proceed with due care. 7 ' Again, taking possession of the papers apparently constituted the requisite
undertaking.
These two cases articulate the proper application of the assumption of duty theory, as well as illuminate the theory's
strengths and weaknesses. 7 61 The major strength of the theory is its
requirement of an undertaking for the benefit of a third party.
This requirement serves not only as a workable reference from
which attorneys can conduct themselves so as to avoid liability to
third parties, but it also serves as an objective standard that can be
utilized by courts and third parties to determine if a cause of action exists. However, the requirement of an undertaking for the
benefit of a third party is also a weakness of the theory. The theory is limited in its application to situations where an undertaking
has been initiated. There do exist situations where a third-party
nonclient should be permitted to recover but where no undertaking
has been initiated. Such a situation exists when the attorney is
hired with the intent to benefit a third party and the attorney simply does nothing. Therefore, since this theory is limited in its application, the recognition of other theories of recovery must be
analyzed.
B.

Factor-BalancingTheory

The factor-balancing theory was originally developed by the
California Supreme Court in the case of Biakanja v. Irving." The
73. The court made reference to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323.
See supra note 58.
74. "Granted, that it was initially the duty of the plaintiff to file the papers
in order to preserve his position as a second creditor." Schwartz, 396 N.Y.S.2d at

584.

75. The standard being: "such care as the duty he assumed to perform re-

quired .

. . ."

Id. at 585.

76. It is the author's contention that neither an assumption of duty theory
nor a third-party beneficiary theory alone affords recovery in all appropriate circumstances, and therefore, both theories must be recognized.
77. 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958). Ironically, this case involved a notary
public rather than an attorney. The plaintiff received only one-eighth of an estate
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initial five factors that were to be balanced in determining duty as
a matter of public policy were: (1) the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff; (2) the foreseeability of
harm to him; (3) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered
injury; (4) the closeness of the connection between the defendant's
conduct and the injury suffered; and (5) the moral blame attached

to the defendant's conduct.7 8 While this theory purportedly began

as a balance of these five factors, it has been noted that, in fact,
the predominant inquiry has centered around a single factor: were
the services intended to benefit the plaintiff?. In fact, in the first
three instances in which the California Supreme Court applied this
approach to third-party recovery for alleged attorney negligence, it
was specifically found that the attorney-client relationship was intended to benefit the third-party plaintiff.80 If this approach were
truly a balancing approach, it would seem that the absence of any
one factor would not necessarily preclude its application.
However, in its most recent application of the factor-balancing
approach, the California Supreme Court denied recovery on the
rather than the entire estate because the will was denied probate as a result of
improper attestation. The court specifically overruled the case of Buckley v. Gray,
(see supra note 31 and accompanying text), thus making the holding applicable to
attorneys. Referring to Glanzer (see supra note 41 and accompanying text), the
court stated that, "[in this situation the 'end and aim' of the transaction was to
benefit plaintiff." 49 Cal. 2d at 650, 320 P.2d at 19.
78. 49 Cal. 2d at 650, 320 P.2d at 19.
79. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 2,

§ 80.

80. Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 584, 264 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962) (will beneficiaries could maintain an action
against attorney for testator, as intended beneficiary of attorney-client relationship; however, attorney had not failed to exercise ordinary care and skill in failing
to understand the intricacies of the Rule Against Perpetuities).
Heyer v. Flaig, 70 Cal. 2d 233, 449 P.2d 161, 74 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1969) (recognizing will beneficiaries as intended beneficiaries of attorney-client relationship).
Donald v. Gary, 19 Cal. App. 3d 769, 97 Cal. Rptr. 191 (1971) (In a suit
brought by a creditor against attorney employed by a collection agency claiming
that due to the attorney's negligence on prosecuting a claim, a debt was unjustifiably discharged, the court found the attorney liable to anyone reasonably intended to be benefited by his professional services.).
For additional decisions in which California courts have dealt with recovery
to third parties for alleged attorney negligence, see Bucquet v. Livingston, 57 Cal.
App. 3d 914, 129 Cal. Rptr. 514 (1976) (attorney liable to beneficiaries of trust for
failure to advise decedent about adverse tax consequences); Ventura City Humane Society for P.C.C.&A., Inc. v. Holliway, 40 Cal. App. 3d 899, 115 Cal. Rptr.
464 (1974) (attorney liable to charity which was intended beneficiary of a will and
which did not take under the will because improper name of charity was used).
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basis that one of the factors was not present. That factor was the
intent to benefit the plaintiff. In Goodman v. Kennedy,81 an attorney had given erroneous advice to his clients concerning the sale of
some securities of which the plaintiffs were the purchasers. The
plaintiffs argued that the "defendant's advice was 'intended to affect' them as purchasers and that harm to them was foreseeable
from the adverse effect of the sale upon the value of the stock contrary to the erroneous assurances embodied in the attorney's negligent advice. '8 2 In holding that no duty existed, the court reasoned
that the "plaintiffs were not persons upon whom defendant's clients had any wish or obligation to confer a benefit in this transaction." 83 The court stated that the potential buyers were not put
"into any relationship with the defendant as 'intended beneficiaries' of his clients' anticipated sales." 8 ' In the face of a strong
dissent,8 5 the court never even addressed the plaintiffs' foreseeability argument.
The California Supreme Court has seemingly altered its approach and tacitly adopted a third-party beneficiary theory. This
apparent shift in approach by the Supreme Court of California
may be best explained by its recognition of the fact that to allow
recovery would "inject undesirable self-protective reservations into
the attorney's counseling role" and would result in both "an undue
burden on the profession" and "a diminution in the quality of legal
services received by the client.""
81. 18 Cal. 3d 335, 556 P.2d 737, 134 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1976).
82. Id. at 344, 556 P.2d at 743, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 381.
83. Id.

84. Id.

85. The dissent argued: "In this case the class of persons certain to be damaged by the attorney's negligent advice to his client was reasonably foreseeable

and the damage was an inexorably direct consequence of the negligent act." Id. at

353, 556 P.2d at 749, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 381. It was further asserted in the dissenting opinion:
The refusal to impose a duty on the attorney in these circumstances unfairly penalizes innocent persons whose injury was the foreseeable result

of the attorney's negligence. In this state we have laid to rest the strictures of the compulsory privity doctrine in malpractice actions by holding that the defendant's liability is based upon tort rather than contract.
It would appear to be a rational corollary and a logical consequence of
that determination to hold that an attorney who negligently advises his

client to enter into a transaction which will inevitably harm another may

be held liable to the person injured.
Id. at 353-54, 556 P.2d at 749, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 387, (Mosk, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 344, 556 P.2d at 743, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 381.
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California's experience with its factor-balancing approach
should serve as a lesson for courts of other jurisdictions. In situations where it cannot be reasonably argued that it was the intent of
the attorney-client relationship to benefit a third party, but where
it can be argued that the subsequent injury was reasonably foreseeable, the balancing approach, when properly used, might allow
recovery. However, to allow recovery only on the basis of foreseeability ignores a paramount concern of the protection of the attors7
ney-client relationship.
C.

Third-Party Beneficiary Theory and Pelham v. Griesheimer

The third-party beneficiary theory has its foundation in contract law.88 When two parties enter into a contract with the intent
to confer a direct benefit to a third party, the third party can sue
on the contract despite the lack of privity.8 9 Thus, when an attorney-client relationship is entered into with the intent to confer a
direct benefit on a third party, the third party may sue in contract.
However, because of a generally longer statute of limitations" and
the possibility of recovering greater damages,"1 the third party may
wish to proceed on a tort theory. Under the tort theory, the third
party would allege that the attorney has breached a duty owed to
the third party by not conferring the benefit that was due him.
The third party's right to sue rests on two policies.9 2 First, the contract creates reasonable expectations in the third party that will
induce him to change his position in reliance thereon.93 Second,
enabling the third party to sue carries out the intentions of the
94
client.
The use of the third-party beneficiary theory of recovery is
very appropriate when applied to the attorney-client relationship.
87. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text for an explanation of why
the attorney-client relationship deserves protection by the courts.
88. For a comprehensive discussion of the third-party beneficiary contract
theory, see 4 A. CORBIN, supra note 34, §§ 772-781.
89. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS indicates that "if recognition

of a right to performance in the beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties and . . . the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends
to give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance," a third party
should be allowed to sue. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 304 (1981).
90. W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 92.
91. Id.

92. 4 A.
93. Id.
94. Id.

CORBIN,

supra note 34, § 775.
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When the intent of the attorney-client relationship is to confer a
direct benefit on a third party, then the attorney's loyalty to his
client 9s will not be diminished, but in fact demands that the benefit be conferred.
Recently the Illinois Supreme Court, in the case of Pelham v.
Griesheimer,9s acknowledged the existence of the third-party beneficiary theory of recovery for third-party nonclients in deciding a
case of alleged attorney negligence. In Pelham, the defendant attorney was retained by the plaintiffs' mother to secure for her a
divorce, which was subsequently granted in June, 1971. 97 A provision of the divorce decree required the husband, George Ray, to
''maintain all four of his children as the prime beneficiaries
of his
life insurance policies."9 " George Ray had a $10,000 life insurance
policy through his employer at the time the divorce decree was entered. Following the divorce, the husband remarried and named his
second wife the beneficiary of the insurance policy. She received
the proceeds after his death in 1976. The plaintiffs' (children's)
amended complaint for legal malpractice was dismissed at trial for
the failure to state a cause of action, and this decision was affirmed
on appeal. 99
The Illinois Supreme Court held that the complaint clearly
failed to state a cause of action for breach of contract. Illinois requires fact pleading. 100 Such pleadings "are to be construed strictly
against the pleader" when considering a motion to dismiss. 10 ' The
liberal construction provisions of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure' 0" cannot cure a defective complaint that has failed to state a
cause of action. 0 8 The court stated that an indispensable element
95. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text for an explanation of why
the attorney-client relationship deserves protection by the courts.
96. 92 Ill. 2d 13, 440 N.E.2d 96 (1982).
97. Id., 440 N.E.2d at 97.

98. Id.

99. 93 Ill. App. 3d 751, 417 N.E.2d 882 (1982).
100. Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, ILL. REV.STAT. ch. 110, §§ 2-601, 2-603
(1983) (formerly ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 31, 33).

101. 92 Ill. 2d at 17, 440 N.E.2d at 98 (quoting Knox College v. Celotex
Corp., 88 Ill. 2d 407, 421, 430 N.E.2d 976, 983 (1981)).

102. See supra note 100 (although the Illinois Civil Practice Act was in force

at the time of the Pelham decision, no substantive changes in these applicable

sections were made by the adoption of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure).
103. 92 Ill. 2d at 17, 440 N.E.2d at 98 (citing Knox College v. Celotex Corp.,
88 Ill.
2d at 427, 430 N.E.2d at 985-86). In Knox College v. Celotex, the Illinois
Supreme Court emphasized that a motion to dismiss admits only well pleaded
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of a third-party beneficiary contract theory is a contract that was
entered into for the direct benefit of the complaining party."" The
plaintiff never alleged this fact, 1 5 and thus, the motion to dismiss
this count of the complaint was appropriate.
The court also held that the complaint for legal malpractice
failed to state a cause of action in negligence. A legally sufficient
complaint for negligence must allege facts to establish a duty running from the defendant to the plaintiff and a breach of that duty
which has proximately caused the plaintiff's injury.1 6 The duty determination is an issue of law for the judge to decide.10 7 In order
for a duty to exist the judge must find a relationship between the
plaintiff and defendant which gives rise to an obligation of reasonable conduct for the plaintiff's benefit.10 8
The court noted the Savings Bank decision 09 and two Illinois
appellate court decisions requiring privity of contract for recovery
by third parties for attorney negligence. 110 However, the court
facts and not conclusions. Conclusions cannot be used to inform the defendant of
the nature of the claim against it. Therefore, when considering a motion to dismiss, the conclusions in the complaint must be deleted. If the remaining facts are
insufficient to state a cause of action, the motion should be granted. Id. at 426,
430 N.E.2d at 985.
104. 92 Ill. 2d at 18, 440 N.E.2d at 98 (citing: Altevogt v. Brinkoetter, 85 Ill.
2d 44, 421 N.E.2d 182 (1981); People ex rel. Resnik v. Curtis & Davis, Architects
& Planners, Inc., 78 Ill. 2d 381, 400 N.E.2d 918 (1980); and Carson Pirie Scott &
Co. v. Parrett, 346 Ill. 252, 178 N.E. 498 (1931)). Although these cases do not deal
with third-party beneficiaries of an attorney-client relationship, the courts' reasoning in these cases can be used as a reference in determining how courts will
analyze an attorney-client, third-party beneficiary problem. See infra notes 12339 and accompanying text.
105. "The amended complaint fails to allege, legally or factually, that a contract was entered into for the direct benefit of the plaintiffs .... ." 92 Ill. 2d at
17-18, 440 N.E.2d at 98 (1982).
106. Cunis v. Brennan, 56 Ill. 2d 372, 374 N.E.2d 617, 618 (1974).
107. 92 Ill. 2d at 18-19, 440 N.E.2d at 98 (citing Mieher v. Brown, 54 Ill. 2d
539, 301 N.E.2d 307 (1973) and W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 45).
108. 92 Ill. 2d at 18-19, 440 N.E.2d at 98.
109. 100 U.S. 195 (1879). See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
110. In Bloomer Amusement Co. v. Eskenazi, 75 Ill. App. 3d 117, 394 N.E.2d
16 (5th Dist. 1979), the appellate court denied recovery in a legal malpractice
action on the basis of lack of privity. A seller of certain real estate brought an
action against the attorney for the buyer, alleging negligence in failing to record
with the deed of conveyance a contemporaneous agreement which reserved to the
plaintiff a one acre parcel of the desired real estate. Relying exclusively on the
100-year-old Savings Bank decision (see supra notes 26-30 and accompanying
text), the Bloomer court held for the defendant attorney. 75 Ill. App. 3d at 119-
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stated: "We consider that privity is not an indispensable prerequisite to establishing a duty of care between a nonclient and an attorney in a suit for legal malpractice.""' The court limited recovery to cases where the plaintiff alleged and proved facts which
demonstrated that they were in the nature of third-party intended
beneficiaries of the attorney-client relationship." 2 The court reasoned that "[iun the area of legal malpractice the attorney's obligations to his client must remain paramount,""13 and "[w]here a client's interest is involved in a proceeding that is adversarial in
nature,[."] the existence of a duty of the attorney to another person would interfere with the undivided loyalty which the attorney
owes his client and would detract from achieving the most advantageous position for his client."' 5
20, 394 N.E.2d at 18.
In Byron Chamber of Commerce, Inc. v. Long, 92 Ill. App. 3d 864, 415 N.E.2d
1361 (2d Dist. 1981), the Illinois Court of Appeals for the Second District denied
recovery in a class action suit where it was alleged that a contract between the
Chamber of Commerce and defendant lav firm was for the benefit of the plaintiffs as third-party beneficiaries. The contract provided that the law firm was to
perform necessary legal work in creating a park district which was to encompass a
nuclear power plant. The defendant erroneously excluded a legal description of
the power plant in the petition for formulation of the park district. The court
stated that "[iln a third-party contract the promisee, in return for the consideration paid to the promisor, obtains a definite tangible benefit for the third person."
92 Ill. App. 3d at 867, 415 N.E.2d at 1364 (citing 4 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 772781 (1952)). The court held that the defendants had no power to confer any benefit on the community.
111. 92 Ill. 2d at 19, 440 N.E.2d at 99.
112. Id. at 20, 440 N.E.2d at 99 (citing: Clagett v. Dacy, 47 Md. App. 23, 420
A.2d 1285 (1980); R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 2, § 80, at 156-59; cf. Marker
v. Greenberg, 313 N.W.2d 4 (Minn. 1981); Brody v. Ruby, 267 N.W.2d 902 (Iowa
1978)).
In Marker v. Greenberg, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that, absent special circumstances such as fraud or improper motive, an attorney is liable for professional negligence only to his client. However, the court recognized situations
giving rise to recovery where the sole purpose for which an attorney is retained is
to directly benefit a third party. In Brody v. Ruby, the Iowa Supreme Court held
an adversary is not a direct and intended beneficiary of a lawyer's services.
113. 92 Ill. 2d at 20, 440 N.E.2d at 99.
114. The Pelham court noted an apparent tendency of the California courts
to be more willing to apply the Biakanja balancing test to cases in which the
attorney's representation of his client had been of a nonadversarial nature.
115. 92 Ill. 2d at 22, 440 N.E.2d at 100 (citing R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra

note 2, § 80, at 159).

See ILL. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 5-107(a) (84 Ill. 2d R. 5107(a)) (requiring a lawyer to represent his client with undivided fidelity), and
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Acknowledging that their approach provides for a broader
scope of liability than found under a privity theory, but a narrower
scope of liability than the balancing approach used in California,11
the Illinois Supreme Court held "that to establish a duty owed by
the defendant attorney to the nonclient the nonclient must allege
and prove that the intent of the client to benefit the nonclient
third party was
the primary or direct purpose of the transaction or
17
relationship."

Applying the "intent to directly benefit" test to the facts alleged in the complaint, the court concluded that the plaintiffs were
not in the nature of direct third-party beneficiaries, but merely incidental beneficiaries at best.11 " Noting that dissolution proceedings are, for the most part, adversarial in nature, the court stressed
its reluctance to create conflict-of-interest situations,11 9 "unless the
Canon 7 (84 Ill. 2d Canon 7) (providing that "[a] lawyer should represent a client zealously within the bounds of the
law"). For a discussion of the preservation of the attorney-client relationship, see
supra notes 51-55 and accompanying lext. The Code of Professional Responsibility can be found in the Illinois Supreme Court Rules, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A,
following 771 (1981).
116. 92 Ill. 2d at 22, 440 N.E.2d at 100 (citing R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra
note 2, § 80, at 161).
Mallen and Levit state that the California test enables those foreseeably injured by an attorney's performance to recover. They also state that Goodman v.
Kennedy, 18 Cal. 3d 335, 556 P.2d 737, 134 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1976) "limited the
circumstances under which a nonbeneficiary may sue another's attorney." R.
MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 2, § 80, at 161. For a more critical analysis of
California's application of its test, see supra notes 77-87 and accompanying text.
117. 92 Ill. 2d at 20-21, 440 N.E.2d at 99-100 (citing Note, Liability in the
Absence of Privity, supra note 2, at 59). "The key consideration is the attorney's
acting at the direction of or on behalf of the client to benefit or influence a third
party." 92 Ill. 2d at 21, 440 N.E.2d at 100 (citing Probert & Hendricks, supra note
7, at 728). Probert and Hendricks explain that the lawyer's conscious undertaking
to benefit or influence a nonclient may create a dependency or a reliance which
outweighs the attorney-client relationship.
118. "That George Ray named the children as beneficiaries of the policy cannot be described as the primary reason that Loretta Ray retained the defendant
to be her attorney." 92 Ill. 2d at 23, 440 N.E.2d at 101.
119. In this case, a conflict could possibly have arisen between the plaintiffs' right to support or the proceeds of the insurance policy versus the
wife's interest in a property settlement and maintenance. The same conflict could arise in all dissolution proceedings when minor children's support issues arise. In this case, if the wife was the beneficiary of the insurance policy in question before the divorce, and the husband insisted on
naming the children as beneficiaries, or the court so decreed, then the
wife's interest would conflict with the children's interest.
ILL. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
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intent to benefit the third party is clearly evident.'

120

The Illinois Supreme Court also explained that an assumption
of duty theory1 21 would have been recognized if the facts supporting it would have been present. The court stated that if the defendant had undertaken a duty to notify the insurance company or
the husband's employer of the provision in the divorce decree, the
plaintiffs' subsequent justifiable reliance may have given rise to the
duty of the attorney to exercise reasonable care.' 22
V.

RAMIFICATIONS OF THE Pelham DECISION ON ILLINOIS
ATTORNEYS

The ramifications of the Pelham decision on Illinois attorneys
depend on how Illinois courts interpret and apply the "intent to
directly benefit" test. As of this writing there have been no reported decisions in Illinois concerning this test in an attorney negligence context. However, since this test has its foundation in
third-party beneficiary contract law, an analysis of how Illinois
courts have dealt with the third-party beneficiary issue in that
context should enable one to reasonably conclude how it will be
dealt with in attorney negligence situations.
In 1931, the Illinois Supreme Court in the case of Carson Pirie
Scott & Co. v. Parrett25 recognized the third-party beneficiary
contract theory. The court held that the benefit to the third person
must be direct rather than merely incidental. 2 " The court stated
that the third-party right must appear affirmatively from proper
construction and interpretation of the contract language.2 2 However, the court further stated that each case depends upon the inId.

120. Id. at 23-24, 440 N.E.2d at 101.

121. See supra notes 57-75 and accompanying text.
122. 92 Ill. 2d at 24, 440 N.E.2d at 101 (citing Schwartz v. Greenfield, 90
Misc. 2d 882, 396 N.Y.S.2d 582 (1977) and Stewart v. Sbarro, 142 N.J. Super. 581,
362 A.2d 581 (1976)). See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
123. 346 Ill. 252, 178 N.E. 498 (1931). Here, a corporation building a hotel
issued bonds secured by a chattel mortgage on the hotel equipment and furnishings. The bond underwriters refused further funding when the corporation became financially unsound. Through a separate contract, two officers of the corporation promised the bond underwriters that certain hotel equipment and

furnishings would be purchased from plaintiff. When the corporation defaulted,
the plaintiff sued the guarantors to recover for equipment and furnishings already
delivered.
124. Id. at 257, 178 N.E. at 501.
125. Id. at 258, 178 N.E. at 501.
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tent of the parties determined from consideration of the whole
contract and of the circumstances surrounding the parties at its
execution, adding that liability cannot be extended or enlarged
merely because the situation or circumstances justify or demand
SO.

12 6

Thus, the Carson Pirie Scott case enables Illinois courts to
look to surrounding circumstances at the time of the execution of
the contract to determine if the requisite intent to directly benefit
a third party is present. However, reliance by a third party, no
matter how justified or detrimental, will not enable recovery by the
third party absent the requisite intent of the client or attorney to
benefit the third party.
The Illinois Supreme Court has recently had two opportunities to interpret the Carson Pirie Scott case. In People ex rel. Resnik v. Curtis & Davis, Architects & Planners, Inc., 27 the court
held that the state could maintain an action as third-party beneficiary of a contract between the Illinois Building Authority and the
defendant.2 8 The court limited its holding to a finding that the
state was a direct beneficiary clearly identified and intended in the
contract.1 2 The significance of this case lies in the surrounding circumstances noted by the court which showed an intent of the parties to benefit the state. The court found that the correctional facility would directly benefit the state, the user, not the parties. The
Illinois Building Authority and the state had also agreed to a construction lease for the facility.130
In Altevogt v. Brinkoetter,'8 ' the purchaser of a new home
claimed to be a third-party beneficiary of a contract between the
seller and the builder. After noting the Carson Pirie Scott and
Resnik decisions mentioned above, the court stated it was not necessary that a third-party beneficiary be identified by name in the
contract. " ' The court held that it was sufficient that the plaintiff
126. Id.
127. 78 111. 2d 381, 400 N.E.2d 918 (1980).

128. Id. at 387, 400 N.E.2d at 920. The Illinois Building Authority contracted
with the defendent for service in connection with the construction of a building.

The building was to be leased to the State Department of Public Safety for use as
a correctional facility. Id. at 382-83, 400 N.E.2d at 918.
129. The contract frequently referred to the department and directed the ar-

chitects to consult with it concerning the design of the building. Id. at 385-86, 400
N.E.2d at 920.
130. Id. at 386, 400 N.E.2d at 920.
131. 85 Ill. 2d 44, 421 N.E.2d 182 (1981).
132. Id. at 55, 421 N.E.2d at 187.
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may be identified at the time performance is due as a member of
the class intended to be benefited. 33 However, the only facts alleged in the plaintiff's complaint which showed an intent on the
part of the defendant to confer a benefit on the plaintiff was that
the builder knew the house was not going to be occupied by the
defendant. 13" The court found such knowledge insufficient to establish the plaintiff's status as a direct beneficiary. 135
Thus in reference to third-party recovery for alleged attorney
negligence, it seems reasonable to conclude that third parties will
not be limited to recovery only when they are specifically mentioned in a written contract between the attorney and client. It
seems sufficient that the third party be identified as a member of a
class intended to be benefited."'
The intent to benefit will be determined not only from the
whole contract but also from the circumstances surrounding the
133. Id. at 55-56, 421 N.E.2d at 187 (citing: RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON139 (1981); 4 A. CORmN, CONTRACTS § 781 (1951); 2 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 356A (3d ed. 1959)).
134. 85 Ill. 2d at 56, 421 N.E.2d at 188.
135. Id.
136. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. It remains uncertain as to
what parameters the Illinois courts will put on the interpretation of their term
"benefit." According to Corbin:
The promised performance may be beneficial to the third party in two
respects: First, it may be a performance that will in itself create new and
beneficial legal relations between him and other persons; and secondly,
without affecting his legal relations at all, it may beneficially affect his
physical, social, and economic relations with the surrounding world. In
either case the promisee may have expressed an intention to produce the
result for the purpose of benefiting the third person; and in either case
the third party may have an enforceable right against the promisor. But
the fact that the promised performance is one that would beneficially
affect the legal relations of the third party has a very considerable evidential weight in determining what the intentions of the promisee were;
it also aids the court in determining whether judgment and execution in
favor of the third party will attain the result for which the promisee contracted. If the promised performance will not affect the legal relations of
the third party, this evidence and this aid to the court are lacking; and
the third party will have no right against the promisor unless other sufficient evidence is produced. Inasmuch as usually no evidence of the promisee's intentions and purposes is produced outside of the terms of the
contract itself, this difference has importance; the third party is more
likely to win in the first class of cases than in the second.
4 A. CORBIN, supra note 34, § 775, at 729.
TRACTS §
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parties. 3 7 However, the Altevogt decision 3 8 contains the logic that
merely because nonclients may be directly benefited by the attorney-client relationship, this will not satisfy the "intent to directly
benefit" test.'3 9 The Illinois Supreme Court has put prospective
third-party beneficiary plaintiffs on notice that more must be alleged and proved.
It seems reasonable to conclude that in situations which traditionally involve third parties, Illinois courts will be willing to grant
recovery to injured third parties provided they can prove an intent
to directly benefit them. The "direct" versus "incidental" dichotomy hopefully will be liberally construed due to the rather restrictive nature of the third-party beneficiary theory of recovery.
A third-party beneficiary theory of recovery for alleged attorney negligence has been utilized by several other jurisdictions. Situations in which it has been successfully used include will 140 and
trust' 4 ' beneficiaries,'4 2 negligent assurances of clear title, '4 3
financial status of borrowers,'" and opinion letters.'4
The Illinois Supreme Court also has recognized recovery by
third-party nonclients for attorney negligence under an assumption of duty theory. Under the assumption of duty theory, several
courts have held an attorney for a buyer or borrower liable when
he promised the seller or lender to file a security agreement but
failed to do so.' 4" The assumption of duty theory is seemingly end137. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
138. 85 Ill. 2d 44, 421 N.E.2d 182 (1981).
139. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
140. See Heyer v. Flaig, 70 Cal. 2d 223, 449 P.2d 161, 74 Cal. Rptr. 225
(1969); Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962); Licata v. Spector, 26 Conn. Supp. 378, 225 A.2d
28 (1966); McAbee v. Edwards, 340 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976). Cf.
Victor v. Goldman, 74 Misc. 2d 685, 344 N.Y.S.2d 672 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
141. See Bucquet v. Livingston, 57 Cal. App. 3d 914, 129 Cal. Rptr. 514
(1976). Cf. In re Brooks, 42 Colo. App. 333, 596 P.2d 1220 (1979).
142. See Johnston, Legal Malpractice in Estate Planning-PerilousTimes
Ahead for the Practitioner,67 IowA L. REv. 629 (1982); Rubinelli, Risk of Liability for Malpractice Increased as Beneficiaries Bring Suit Against Planners, 8
EST. PLAN.

66 (1981).

143. See Capital Bank & Trust Co. v. Core, 343 So. 2d 284 (La. App.), cert.
denied, 345 So. 2d 61 (La. 1977). Cf. Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Holt, 36 N.C. App.
284, 244 S.E.2d 177 (1978).
144. See Capital Bank & Trust, 343 So. 2d 284.
145. See Roberts v. Ball, 57 Cal. App. 3d 104, 128 Cal. Rptr. 901 (1976).
146. See Simmerson v. Blanks, 149 Ga. App. 478, 254 S.E.2d 716 (1979);
Stewart v. Sbarro, 142 N.J. Super. 581, 362 A.2d 581 (1977); Schwartz v. Green-
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less in its application, provided the proper facts are present to support the application.1 4 7
V.

CONCLUSION

The requirement of privity which has long protected attorneys
from malpractice claims asserted by third-party nonclients is now
being seriously questioned by many jurisdictions.""8 Illinois, in
joining the trend away from the privity requirement, has taken a
conservative stance. Recovery is limited to situations where the
plaintiff can allege and prove that the client's intent to benefit or
influence the third-party nonclient was the primary purpose of the
attorney-client relationship. This conservative stance is mandated
in order to preserve the attorney's duty of loyalty to his client.
PATRICK EDWARD BRAUN

field, 90 Misc. 2d 882, 396 N.Y.S.2d 582 (1977); Lawall v. Groman, 180 Pa. 532, 37
A. 114 (1897).
147. See supra notes 57-76 and accompanying text.
148. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.

